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Abstract
Kuhn’s Theorem shows that extensive games with perfect recall can equivalently be
analyzed using mixed or behavioral strategies, as long as players are expected utility
maximizers. This note constructs an example that illustrates the limits of Kuhn’s
Theorem in an environment with ambiguity averse players who use a maxmin decision
rule and full Bayesian updating.
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1 Introduction
A classic result in game theory, Kuhn’s Theorem (Kuhn, 1953) shows that for each mixed
strategy in an extensive game with perfect recall, there exists an outcome-equivalent be-
havioral strategy, and vice versa.1 In light of the fact that expected utility maximizers are
dynamically consistent based on Bayesian updating, the principal implication of Kuhn’s
Theorem is that the optimality of a mixed strategy in the strategic form of an extensive
game is equivalent to the conditional optimality of its outcome-equivalent behavioral strat-
egy, at all information sets that are reached with positive probability according to a player’s
beliefs about the strategies of his opponents, as pointed out by Brandenburger (2007).
This equivalence between mixed and behavioral strategies does not extend to games
where players are ambiguity averse in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), so that
beliefs are represented by sets of probability measures, and a maxmin decision rule is used
to define optimality. Such set-valued beliefs of a player in an extensive game may arise in
a number of settings, which could include Bayesian games where players have ambiguous
information about opponents’ types as in Kajii and Ui (2005), games where equilibria
are defined by ambiguous beliefs as in Lo (1996), games where players are allowed to use
ambiguous randomization devices as in Riedel and Sass (2014), or games where players’
beliefs are defined through ambiguous trembles of their opponents’ unambiguous strategies
as in Aryal and Stauber (2014). If we consider an extensive game with complete (but
not necessarily perfect) information, so that each player i only faces uncertainty regarding
his opponents’ strategies, and this uncertainty is represented by set-valued beliefs, the
standard Kuhn’s Theorem still yields the existence of (unambiguous) behavioral and mixed
strategies βi and µi for this player that are outcome-equivalent for every element of his
(set-valued) beliefs. However, if this player uses full Bayesian updating to derive beliefs
at each information set, combined with a maxmin decision rule, optimality of the mixed
strategy µi in the strategic form need not correspond to the conditional optimality of the
outcome-equivalent behavioral strategy βi at information sets that are reached according
to any element of the player’s ambiguous beliefs. This is a straightforward consequence of
the well-known fact that maxmin expected utility is not dynamically consistent with full
1See Maschler et al. (2013) for a thorough exposition of this result. Two strategies are outcome-equivalent
if they induce the same distribution over terminal histories, irrespective of the strategies used by a player’s
opponents.
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Bayesian updating.2
In an interesting paper, Epstein and Schneider (2003) show that dynamic consistency
can be restored in dynamic choice settings with maxmin preferences and full Bayesian
updating, as long as the overall uncertainty a decision-maker faces can be captured by
a set of priors that has a “rectangularity” property. Roughly, rectangularity means that
the initial set of priors can be constructed by recursively combining all its corresponding
conditional and marginal probabilities at each stage of the information filtration. Sass
(2013) shows that the characterization of Epstein and Schneider (2003) can be applied in
extensive games with perfect information to recover a version of Kuhn’s Theorem, which
implies that in environments with perfect information, the dynamic consistency associated
to the standard Kuhn’s Theorem can be recovered through the use of mixed strategies
that possess a type of rectangularity property. The principal contribution of this note is to
consider whether this approach can be extended to derive restrictions on ex-ante ambiguous
beliefs/strategies, such as the rectangularity property identified by Epstein and Schneider
(2003), that yield dynamic consistency in extensive games with imperfect information. We
show by means of an example that such restrictions are not possible, if any two players’
ambiguous beliefs about a third opponent’s strategies are required to be consistent—in the
sense that these beliefs are the same—and each player’s beliefs regarding the strategies of
his opponents are independent across players.
2 Analysis
We first present an example that shows that the dynamic consistency associated to stan-
dard expected utility maximization may not hold in extensive games with ambiguity averse
players, which implies that an analysis based on the extensive form of a game may yield
different conclusions than one based on its strategic form. We then show how dynamic
consistency might be recovered in this example, using the rectangularity property identi-
fied by Epstein and Schneider (2003). Finally, we construct an extension of the example
which shows that this approach to achieving dynamic consistency cannot be extended to all
extensive games with perfect recall. Our examples are all standard extensive games with
imperfect information and perfect recall, as defined in Maschler et al. (2013), for example.
2See, for example, Epstein and Schneider (2003) and Epstein and Le Breton (1993).
2
L R
O
x,−1
1
M
x, 0
N
x, 101
M
x, 101
N
x, 100
2
Figure 1: A two-player example.
Consider the game described in Figure 1, which is a slight modification of an example
from Aryal and Stauber (2014). Since each player only moves at one information set, the
two players’ sets of mixed and behavioral strategies are identical, so Kuhn’s Theorem holds
trivially. However, if we interpret mixed strategies as strategies in the strategic form as-
sociated to the extensive game, choosing a mixed strategy by player 2 implicitly requires
that this player commits to a randomization over actions before the start of the game, and
hence before he knows whether his information set is reached or not, following player 1’s
actions. If 2’s beliefs about 1’s strategies are unambiguous, and if 2’s information set is
reached with strictly positive probability according to these beliefs, the ex ante optimality
of a (mixed) strategy of player 2 is equivalent to the conditional optimality of the respec-
tive (behavioral) strategy at 2’s information set. This is a consequence of the dynamic
consistency of expected utility maximization.
Now assume that player 2 is ambiguity averse, and that his (ambiguous) beliefs about
player 1’s strategy are given by an ε-contamination of the strategy that assigns probability
1 to action R.3 Denoting the strategy assigning probability 1 to R by β∗1 = (l∗, r∗, o∗) =
(0, 1, 0), and the set of all distributions over {L,R,O} by ∆1, an ε-contamination of β∗1 for
some small ε > 0 is defined by the set of distributions
βε1 := (1− ε)β∗1 + ε∆1.
The projection of the set βε1 onto the l-r plane is illustrated by the gray-shaded triangle in
Figure 2.4 Denote a strategy of player 2 by β2 = (m, 1 −m), where m is the probability
3See Aryal and Stauber (2014) for an interpretation of such beliefs.
4The origin of the coordinate system corresponds to player 1 playing O with probability 1.
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Figure 2: An ε-contamination.
assigned to action M , and assume that player 2 chooses a value of m in the strategic form
of the game, and hence is able to commit to m before knowing whether his information set
is reached or not. If 2 follows a maxmin decision rule given βε1, he then chooses m to solve
max
m∈[0,1]
min
(l,r,o)∈βε1
{o(−1) + l[101(1−m)] + r[101m+ 100(1−m)]}.
Clearly, for every m ∈ [0, 1], the minimum in this problem is attained at (l, r, o) = (0, 1 −
ε, ε), and hence 2’s optimal choice is to set m = 1.
In order to consider 2’s optimal strategy conditional on reaching his information set,
we derive his conditional beliefs at the information set using full Bayesian updating of all
distributions in βε1.
5 In Figure 2, the resulting conditional beliefs over the information set
{L,R} are represented by the thick black line connecting the points (0, 1) and (ε, 1 − ε).
Letting δ denote the probability assigned to history R, 2’s optimal choice of a (behavioral)
strategy must solve
max
m∈[0,1]
min
δ∈[1−ε,1]
{δ[101m+ 100(1−m)] + (1− δ)(1−m)101}
= max
m∈[0,1]
min
δ∈[1−ε,1]
{δ(102m− 1) + 101(1−m)}
= max
m∈[0,1]
100 +m, if m ≤
1
102 ,
100 + ε+ (1− 102ε)m, if m > 1102 .
5Note that in this particular case, 2’s information set is reached with positive probability according to
every element of βε1 .
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It follows that as long as 1 − 102ε < 0, or equivalently, ε > 1102 , the optimal conditional
strategy of player 2 is to set m = 1102 , so his optimal choice is not dynamically consistent.
If we interpret 2’s beliefs as defined by the ε-contamination as a set of priors correspond-
ing to a dynamic decision problem for player 2, then this set of priors does not satisfy the
rectangularity condition of Epstein and Schneider (2003) that guarantees dynamic consis-
tency, so the dynamic inconsistency is not unexpected. We now explain the implications of
rectangularity for player 2’s dynamic decision problem, referring to Epstein and Schneider
(2003) for a general definition. 2’s information structure is given by a filtration (F 02 ,F
1
2 ),
where F 02 = {L,R,O}, F 12 = {{L,R}, {O}}, and all information is revealed after 2 chooses
an action. The restriction of every prior p0 ∈ ∆1 to F 12 defines a marginal, or one-step-
ahead, distribution p0+ over F
1
2 , such that p
0 can be decomposed in terms of p0+ and its
conditional given F 12 , denoted by p
1, using the standard form
p0 =
∫
F02
p1dp0+.
A set of priors P ∈ ∆1 is rectangular if it is defined by all the compositions of all its
conditionals and one-step-ahead distributions, so for every one-step-ahead distribution p0+
corresponding to some p0 ∈ P , and every conditional q1 corresponding to some q0 ∈ P , the
composition
∫
F02
q1dp0+ is also an element of P . Epstein and Schneider (2003) note that
any set of conditionals P 1 combined with any set of one-step-ahead distributions P 0+ define
an induced rectangular set of priors given by
P(P 1, P 0+) :=
{∫
F02
q1dp0+
∣∣∣∣∣ q1 ∈ P 1, p0+ ∈ P 0+
}
.
In our example, player 2’s beliefs are defined by a set of priors P ∈ ∆1 such that P = βε1. If
P 1 and P 0+ denotes the sets of all conditionals and one-step-ahead distributions associated
to elements of P , then P(P 1, P 0+) is the smallest rectangular set of priors containing P ,
as noted by Epstein and Schneider (2003). The set of induced one-step-ahead distributions
is given by all distributions that assign a probability between 0 and ε to the event {O},
and the remaining probability to the event {L,R}. Combining these distributions with
the previously described conditionals according to the formula for P(P 1, P 0+), yields the
smallest rectangular set of priors containing P = βε1. In Figure 3, the rectangular set
P(P 1, P 0+) is given by the union of the gray and light gray shaded triangles. As explained
in Epstein and Schneider (2003), the two lines with slope −1 form the boundary of the
5
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Figure 3: The smallest rectangular set of priors containing βε1.
region where the probability of {O} lies between 0 and ε, and the vertical axis together
with the dashed line form the boundary of the region that induces the conditionals over
{L,R} represented by the thick black line. Combining the associated one-step-ahead and
conditional distributions yields the resulting rectangular set.
If we now consider player 2’s problem resulting from (ambiguous) beliefs induced by
the rectangular set P(P 1, P 0+), we get the same optimal choice of m at 2’s information set,
since the set of conditional beliefs resulting from full Bayesian updating does not change.
However, the ex ante problem of choosing a mixed strategy in the strategic form now
becomes
max
m∈[0,1]
min
p+∈[0,ε], δ∈[1−ε,1]
{p+(−1) + (1− p+) {δ[101m+ 100(1−m)] + (1− δ)(1−m)101}} ,
which clearly has the same solution as the conditional problem, and hence dynamic consis-
tency is restored.
The previous example suggests that it might be possible to restore dynamic consistency
in extensive games by restricting every player’s beliefs about his opponents’ strategies in a
way that generates rectangular priors for the filtration defining the player’s associated de-
cision problem. We show next, by constructing an appropriate example, that this approach
cannot be used to ensure dynamic consistency in general games.
Consider the three player game described in Figure 4. This game is an extension of
the two player game we analyzed previously, and since player 2’s payoffs are assumed
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Figure 4: A three-player example.
to be independent of player 3’s actions, our previous analysis and the result of Epstein
and Schneider (2003), which shows the equivalence of dynamic consistency and rectangular
priors, imply that in order to guarantee dynamic consistency for player 2, we need to assume
that 2’s beliefs about 1’s actions are given by a rectangular prior. Since 2’s information is
given by the same filtration as in the previous game, any rectangular set of priors must be
of the form described by the gray area in Figure 5. If player 3’s (ambiguous) beliefs about
player 1’s actions are required to be consistent with player 2’s beliefs, then the rectangularity
requirements that we need to ensure dynamic consistency for player 2, imply that 3’s beliefs
about 1’s actions must be rectangular relative to 2’s information filtration. We thus assume
that players 2 and 3 have identical priors over 1’s actions, given by a rectangular set such
as the one described in Figure 5. Furthermore, assuming that 3’s beliefs about 2’s actions
are independent of his beliefs about 1’s actions, we can represent such (ambiguous) beliefs
by an interval [a, b] ⊆ [0, 1], where any n ∈ [a, b] denotes the probability 2 assigns to action
N .
To analyze dynamic consistency for player 3, note that his information filtration is given
by F 03 = {LM,LN,RM,RN,O} and F 13 = {{LM,LN,RM}, {RN,O}}. Since 3’s payoffs
arising from the terminal histories LM , LN and RM are assumed to be identical, we can
combine these histories into a single “state” for player 3, which we will denote by Z. We can
then rewrite the filtration as F 03 = {Z,RN,O} and F 13 = {{Z}, {RN,O}}, and represent
any prior in a two-dimensional “Machina triangle” where the horizontal axis represents the
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Figure 5: A rectangular set of priors for player 2.
probability of state Z, denoted by z, the vertical axis represents the probability of state
RN , denoted by rn, and the origin is equivalent to state O. Given a strategy of player
1 denoted by (l, r, o), and an independent strategy of player 2 denoted by n, the induced
prior over 3’s state space assigns probability o to state O, probability rn to state RN , and
probability l+ r(1− n) to state Z. Since the origins of the triangles representing the prior
(l, r, o) for players 2 and the corresponding prior (l + r(1− n), rn, o) ≡ (z, rn, o) for player
3 both coincide with probability 1 assigned to state O, we can represent both priors on the
same triangle. As the probability of O stays constant, a “shift” from (l, r, o) to (z, rn, o) is
captured by a movement along the line of slope −1 that corresponds to the probability o,
as described by a move from point E to point F in Figure 6.
If both 2’s and 3’s beliefs about 1’s actions are captured by the same arbitrary set of
priors that is rectangular with respect to 2’s information filtration, such as the one described
in Figure 5, and 3’s beliefs about 2’s actions are captured by a set [a, b] representing
probabilities n assigned to action N , we can represent the induced set of priors for player
3’s filtration by shifting all points of the rectangular set spanned by the points {A,B,C,D}
in Figure 5, analogously to the shift from Figure 6. As long as 0 < a < b < 1, this would
imply that each point (l, r, o) from the initial rectangular set will yield a set of points along
the line of slope −1 corresponding to o, such that the corresponding set of “rn-coordinates”
lie in the interval [ra, rb]. The full initial set spanned by {A,B,C,D} in the l-r plane then
yields a set of priors for player 3 in the z-rn plane, which is represented in Figure 7 by the
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gray shaded area spanned by {A′, B′, C ′, D′}. Note that the northwest boundary A′D′ of
this induced set of priors corresponds to the northwest boundary AD of the initial set of
priors, transformed using the larger value n = b; similarly, the southeast boundary B′C ′ is
induced by the initial southeast boundary BC, transformed using the smaller value n = a.6
Hence, if rA and rD, and lA and lD denote the r- and l-coordinates, respectively, of the
points A and D in Figure 5, then the rn-coordinates of the points A′ and D′ in Figure 7
will be given by rAb and rDb, and the z-coordinates of A
′ and D′ are zA′ = lA + rA(1− b)
and zD′ = lD + rD(1 − b). Since rA > rD and lA > lD, this implies that both the rn and
the z coordinates of A′ exceed those of D′. A similar argument shows that the rn and the
z coordinates of B′ exceed those of C ′. Since the lines connecting A′ and B′, and C ′ and
D′, must both have slope −1, this implies that the set spanned by {A′, B′, C ′, D′} cannot
be rectangular relative to player 3’s filtration, because such a rectangular set would have
to be bounded by two vertical lines representing constant values of z, and by two lines that
6Note that any point (αl+(1−α)l′, αr+(1−α)r′) on the line connecting two elements (l, r) and (l′, r′) of
the initial rectangular set, if transformed using some value of n, will lie on the line connecting the respective
transformations of (l, r) and (l′, r′), if based on the same value of n, since
(αl+(1−α)l′+[αr+(1−α)r′](1−n), [αr+(1−α)r′]n) = (α[l+r(1−n)]+(1−α)[l′+r′(1−n)], αrn+(1−α)r′n).
This implies that the boundaries A′D′ and B′C′ must always be straight lines. Furthermore, since the
initial points A and D yield identical conditionals over {L,R}, the points A′ and D′ will yield identical
conditionals over {Z,RN}, and similarly for B′ and C′.
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bound the set of all priors that map to some interval of conditional beliefs over {RN,O}
(such as the thick black line on the rn-axis in Figure 7). The failure of rectangularity for
player 3’s information filtration implies that there exist payoffs for player 3 under which
dynamic consistency does not hold.
3 Conclusion
Our analysis shows that if any two players’ ambiguous beliefs about a third player in a
game are required to be consistent, and each player’s beliefs regarding the strategies of his
opponents are assumed to be independent across players, then the dynamic consistency
implicit in Kuhn’s Theorem cannot be achieved in every extensive game with imperfect
information and ambiguity averse players, even if additional rectangularity assumptions
are introduced. The obvious implication is that an analysis of such games must rely on the
extensive form and on a consistent planning assumption in the spirit of Strotz (1955-1956).
Alternatively, if an analyst wants to use the strategic form of a game and retain dynamic
consistency, he may do so by using ambiguous beliefs that are rectangular, but then he must
either allow for inconsistencies of beliefs across players, or restrict his analysis to extensive
games forms for which rectangular beliefs are guaranteed to yield dynamic consistency. A
recent paper by Mouraviev, Riedel, and Sass (2014) identifies restrictions that characterize
a corresponding class of games.
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